

Message Text

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C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 283396

EXDIS DISTRIBUTE AS NODIS WHITE HOUSE FOR BRZEZINSKI

C O R R E C T E D COPY (MRN SHOULD READ 283396 VICE 283386)

FOL TEL SENT ACTION SECSTATE INFO DAR ES SALAAM GABORONE
LAGOS LONDON MAPUTO PRETORIA USUN NEW YORK FROM LUSAKA
DTD 28 NOV 1977 QTE

C O N F I D E N T I A L LUSAKA 3583

EXDIS HANDLE AS NODIS

USUN FOR AMBASSADOR YOUNG

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PDEV RH US UK ZA
SUBJ: RHODESIA: MEETING WITH PRESIDENT KAUNDA

SUMMARY: KAUNDA ARGUED FOR AMENDMENT OF THE ANGLO-
AMERICAN PROPOSALS TO TURN POWER OVER TO THE PATRIOTIC
FRONT, SAYING HE HAD ALWAYS CONSIDERED ALL THE PROVISIONS
OF THE PROPOSALS TO BE OPEN FOR DISCUSSION. HE GAVE
THE IMPRESSION, HOWEVER, THAT HE DID NOT EXPECT HIS
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ADVICE TO BE HEHEDED BUT RATHER THAT HE WAS GIVING IT
FOR THE RECORD SO THAT IF THINGS DID NOT GO WELL,
HE WOULD BE COVERED. HE MENTIONED THE TANZANIAN
PARTY DELEGATION, WHICH WAS DUE TO ARRIVE IN LUSAKA
SUNDAY, TO HELP RESOLVE DIFFERENCES. END SUMMARY.

1. AFTER HANDING ME HIS MEMORANDUM AND LETTER TO
PRESIDENT CARTER, PRESIDENT KAUNDA DESCRIBED THE
BACKGROUND OF HIS THINKING WHICH HAD LED TO HIS
CONCLUSION THAT THE ANGLO-AMERICAN PROPOSAL (AAP)

NEEDED AMENDMENT. KAUNDA SAID HE WANTED TO EXPLAIN HIS POSITION IN DETAIL TO PRESIDENT CARTER, WHO HAD SHOWN IN HIS MOST RECENT LETTER THAT HE UNDERSTOOD THAT THEY WERE BOTH WORKING IN THE SAME DIRECTION FOR A SETTLEMENT IN RHODESIA.

2. KAUNDA SAID THAT THE DECISION BY THE FRONTLINE TO ACCEPT THE AAP AS A BASIS FOR NEGOTIATION AT THE MAPUTO FRONTLINE MEETING RESULTED LARGELY FROM THE LETTERS WHICH HAD BEEN RECEIVED FROM PRESIDENT CARTER, ANDY YOUNG AND JIM CALLAGHAN. THEY ACCEPT THE AAP, HOWEVER, ON THE UNDERSTANDING THAT EVERYTHING WAS NEGOTIABLE. THIS WAS WHY HE WAS WRITING HIS THOUGHTS IN DETAIL, SO THAT WE COULD HAVE THE BENEFIT OF HIS SUGGESTIONS ON HOW TO IMPROVE THE AAP.

3. THE PRESIDENT MENTIONED HIS DIFFERENCES WITH THE TANZANIANS AND NOTED THAT A PARTY DELEGATION FROM TANZANIA WAS EXPECTED THAT AFTERNOON (SUNDAY THE 27TH) TO IRON OUT THEIR DIFFERENCES. GOVERNMENTS WOULD NATURALLY TAKE THEIR INSTRUCTIONS FROM PARTY DECISIONS.

4. KAUNDA COMPLAINED STRONGLY ABOUT THE BRITISH:
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THEIR FAILURE TO SUPPORT ZAMBIA IN THE FACE OF THEIR RESPONSIBILITY FOR HAVING CREATED THE PROBLEM BY PERMITTING UDI IN 1965; OWEN'S INSENSITIVITY IN FORWARDING SMITH'S WARNING; MORE RECENTLY NEWS VIA A "THIRD PARTY" (CHONA LATER INDICATED A FRONTLINE PRESIDENT) THAT OWEN WAS "ANGRY WITH ME" FOR GETTING OUT OF LINE WITH THE REST OF THE FRONTLINE. LATER CHONA ADDED A FINAL COMPLAINT WITH OWEN OVER STORIES COMING OUT OF LONDON THAT OWEN SAID HE WOULD PREFER DEALING WITH MACHEL THAN ANY OF THE OTHER MEMBERS OF THE FRONTLINE.

5. I TOLD THE PRESIDENT THAT OF COURSE I COULD NOT RESPOND FOR PRESIDENT CARTER BUT I COULD GIVE HIM A FEW OF MY PERSONAL REACTIONS TO RECENT EVENTS. I SAID WE ACCEPTED THAT HE WAS SINCERELY SEEKING A SETTLEMENT IN RHODESIA WITH A MINIMUM OF VIOLENCE AND LOSS OF LIFE AND WE RECOGNIZED THAT THE TWO POINTS HE BROUGHT UP-- DIFFICULTY OF AVOIDING VIOLENCE IN AN ELECTION AND THE PROBLEM OF CREATING AN ARMY WHICH WOULD BE LOYAL TO WHOEVER WAS ELECTED--WERE CENTRAL TO THE PROBLEM. WHILE WE RECOGNIZED THE PROBLEMS, THOSE WITH WHOM I HAD SPOKEN WHO HAD STUDIED THE SITUATION CAREFULLY BELIEVED THAT BOTH COULD BE ACCOMPLISHED AND HAD MADE CAREFUL PROPOSALS TO DO SO. ON THE OTHER HAND, IT WAS UNCLEAR TO ME HOW VIOLENCE COULD BE AVOIDED IF ANY ONE OF THE NATIONALIST LEADERS WAS SIMPLY DESIGNATED TO RECEIVE POWER. I SAID THAT THE PRESIDENT WAS NOT UNAWARE OF THE DIVISIONS WITHIN

THE PF. IT WAS NOT CLEAR TO ME HOW THE THREE SEPARATE ARMIES IN EXISTENCE WOULD SORT THINGS OUT WITHOUT VIOLENCE. KAUNDA REPLIED SOMEWHAT IMPATIENTLY THAT THE NEW ARMY WOULD BE CREATED UNDER THE AAP; WHAT HE WAS SUGGESTING WAS "WITHIN THE PLAN", HE EMPHASIZED.

6. I SAID I PERSONALLY DID NOT SEE HOW AN AMERICAN OR FOR THAT MATTER BRITISH ADMINISTRATION COULD SUPPORT ANY PROPOSAL WHICH DID NOT INCLUDE VOICE OF THE GOVERNMENT
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BY ELECTIONS. PARTICULARLY IN VIEW OF PRESIDENT CARTER'S OUTSPOKEN COMMITMENT TO HUMAN RIGHTS, ANYTHING ELSE WOULD NOT BE UNDERSTOOD IN THE UNITED STATES. FURTHER IT SEEMED A SHAME TO PASS UP THIS OPPORTUNITY FOR US-UK SUPPORT IN THE EFFORT TO GET RID OF SMITH THROUGH THIS PROPOSAL.

7. KAUNDA ASKED ABOUT OUR REACTION TO SMITH'S ANNOUNCEMENT OF A FEW DAYS AGO. SO FAR AS HE WAS CONCERNED, IT WAS "JUST A JOKE". I SAID WE WELCOMED ANY PROGRESS TOWARDS UNIVERSAL SUFFRAGE BUT THAT IT WAS NOT CLEAR JUST WHAT SMITH WAS OFFERING, OR WHAT HE WAS DEMANDING IN RETURN, PARTICULARLY AS TO ASSURANCES TO THE WHITE COMMUNITY,

MILITARY ARRANGEMENTS, ETC. I PERSONALLY SAW LITTLE CHANCE OF A SOLUTION SUCCEEDING WHICH DID NOT TAKE INTO CONSIDERATION THE LIBERATION FORCES. AS FAR AS WE WERE CONCERNED, HOWEVER, I WAS CERTAIN WE WOULD WANT TO PROCEED WITH OUR PROPOSAL AND ASSUMED THAT HE AGREED THIS WOULD MAKE SENSE. THE PRESIDENT NODDED. I ADDED THAT I THOUGHT BOTH MUZOREWA AND SITHOLE WOULD RESIST SETTLEMENTS WHICH INCLUDED RACIAL BLOCKING MECHANISMS, RESTRICTIONS ON THE FRANCHISE, AND DID NOT TAKE INTO CONSIDERATION THE LIBERATION FORCES. KAUNDA INDICATED HIS PROFOUND MISTRUST OF BOTH MUZOREWA AND SITHOLE AND REPEATED SMITH'S COMPLAINT THAT THEY SAY ONE THING TO ONE PERSON AND ANOTHER TO THE NEXT. HE DOUBTED SITHOLE'S ASSURANCES TO US THAT HE WAS NOT INTERESTED IN AN INTERNAL SETTLEMENT.

8. THE PRESIDENT REFERRED TO HIS INTERVIEW WITH BRIDGET BLOOM IN WHICH HE HAD SAID THAT HE HOPED THAT EVENTS WOULD NOT PROVE HIM CORRECT.
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9. IN A SHORT PRIVATE DISCUSSION WITH MARK CHONA AFTER MY MEETING WITH THE PRESIDENT, HE ELABORATED FURTHER ON THIS COMMENT, SAYING IN EFFECT THAT ZAMBIA WOULD GO ALONG WITH THE REST OF US BUT ADDING THAT THE US-UK COULD NOT

SAY LATER THAT THEY HAD NOT BEEN WARNED.

10. COMMENT: THE PRESIDENT'S REMARK TO BRIDGET BLOOM, CHONA'S TO ME, AND THE LAST PARAGRAPH OF HIS LETTER IN WHICH HE MORE OR LESS ASSUMES THAT HIS ADVICE WILL NOT BE HEEDDED AND THAT WHEN PEOPLE REALIZE HE WAS RIGHT IT WILL BE TOO LATE, GIVE THE STRONG IMPRESSION THAT THE ZAMBIANS ARE NOW ARGUING THEIR CASE FOR THE RECORD AND MAY SOON ACCEPT THE AAP PROVISIONS FOR ELECTIONS PRIOR TO INDEPENDENCE FOR THE SAKE OF UNITY. IN DOING SO, THEY LEAVE OPEN THE POSSIBILITY THAT THE PF OR AT LEAST ZAPU MAY NOT ACCEPT THE PROPOSALS. THEY MIGHT EVEN GO SO FAR AS TO GIVE QUIET ASSISTANCE TO ZAPU IN CONTINUING THE STRUGGLE. IN THIS SENSE THEIR PROPHECY COULD HAVE A SELF-FULFILLING QUALITY. I DOUBT, HOWEVER, THAT THEY WOULD GO OUT CONSCIOUSLY TO TRY TO UNDERMINE THE PROPOSALS SHOULD THEY BE ACCEPTED.

11. FROM THE CONVERSATIONS, AS WELL AS FROM THE LETTER AND MEMORANDUM, IT WOULD APPEAR THAT THE ZAMBIANS HAVE NOT YET THOUGHT THEIR PROPOSAL THROUGH. TO TURN OVER POWER TO A PATRIOTIC FRONT AS DIVIDED AS IT IS AT THE MOMENT WOULD BE TO GIVE AUTHORITY TO THREE SEPARATE ARMIES. KAUNDA SAYS HE ACCEPTS THE AAP IN UNIFYING THOSE ARMIES BUT IT IS NOT CLEAR HOW THAT CAN BE DONE WHEN THERE IS NO BRITISH ADMINISTERED TRANSITION PERIOD AND NO AUTHORITY WHICH COULD COMMAND THE ARMIES. LOW UNQTE VANCE

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